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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3714 
 ___________ 
 
 TORMU E. PRALL, 




JOSEPH L. BOCCHINI, JR.; ARTHUR R. SYPEK, JR.; CHARLES ELLIS;  
PHYLLIS OLIVER; MICHELLE R. RICCI; BRIAN M. HUGHES;  
KELVIN S. GANGES; ANDREW A. MAIR; SARAH G. CROWLEY; J. MCCALL;  
E. WILLIAMS; T. WILKIE; NURSE PETE S.; DR. ROBERT ROTH; DR.  
GOORIAH; SOCIAL WORKER LYDIA; WILLIAM J. MOLEINS; CHRIS  
HOLMES; JIMMY BARNES; JAMES DRUMM; RON WANGER; JAMES KEIL; LT. 
ALAIMO; CRYSTAL RAUPP; MS. ISHMAEL; SHIRLEY STEPHENS; SGT. 
NEWSOM; ORTIZ; JOHN DOE 1-25; JOHN MOES 1-10; JOHN ROES 1-99 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-01228) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 24, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 











 Tormu E. Prall appeals pro se from the order of the District Court denying him 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  He also seeks leave to proceed IFP on 
appeal.  Prall’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal is granted, and we will vacate the 
District Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
 Prall is a New Jersey prisoner with “three strikes” under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”).  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  Accordingly, he may not proceed with 
a civil action or appeal without pre-paying the filing fee unless he “is under imminent 
danger of serious physical injury.”  Id.  The danger must be imminent at the time the 
complaint is filed.  See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Prall filed the IFP motion at issue here along with a complaint in the District 
Court.  His complaint is premised largely on his position that he is a “conscientious 
objector” to the New Jersey criminal justice system.  As relevant here, however, Prall 
also alleges that he was housed in a cell with “blood and feces” on the floor and that his 
complaint about those conditions led “correction officers to slap, choke, punch, kick, club 
and threaten him.”  (Compl. ¶ 14.)  He further alleges that “correction officers continue to 
physically and mentally abuse plaintiff in the same fashion until he renounces his 
conscientious beliefs.”  (Id. ¶ 15.) 
 Before the District Court ruled on Prall’s IFP motion, he submitted an amended 
complaint.  The amended complaint names the correctional officers whom he alleges 
continue to assault him and further alleges, among other things, that: 
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Prall is subjected to torture in MCU at least once a week.  One of the 
methods defendant Newsom and unknown named defendants-corrections 
officers use is to choke Prall until he loses consciousness; slap Prall’s face; 
and roughly stomp on Prall’s toes and fingers with their boots.  The other 
method is to spray mace in Prall’s eyes, up his nose, down his throat, on his 
genitals, and to the surface of his rectum.  Another method used is to poke 
Prall with needles, kick him with boots, beat him with fist to the body, and 
electrocute with devices that can burn holes in a rug and rupture the 
speakers in a television set.  During the course of non-routine body 
searches, . . . [Prall] is threatened that defendant Newsom and defendants-
correction officers will man-handled [sic] and sodomize him with sticks. 
 
(Id. ¶ 76.) 
 By order entered August 16, 2010, the District Court denied Prall’s motion to 
proceed IFP.  In doing so, the District Court concluded that Prall had raised only 
“perfunctory and insufficient claims of ‘imminent danger’” and that “his allegations are 
limited solely to a past incident which fails to allege serious physical injury.”  (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 5-6.) 
Prall appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the denial of 
leave to proceed IFP, see Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 311, and we exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s interpretation of § 1915(g), see Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 
964 (3d Cir. 1998).  We conclude that the District Court erred in denying Prall’s IFP 
motion here. 
Pro se allegations of imminent danger must be evaluated in accordance with the 
liberal pleading standard applicable to pro se litigants.  See id. at 966; Gibbs v. Roman, 
116 F.3d 83, 86 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Abdul-Akbar, 239 
F.3d at 312.  This standard does not require district courts to accept “allegations that are 
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fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of the ‘irrational or wholly incredible.’”  
Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 967 (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).  The 
District Court did not conclude that Prall’s allegations rise to that level, however, and we 
cannot say that they do.  Instead, the District Court concluded that they were 
“insufficient” and related solely to a past incident.  We express no opinion on the merits 
of Prall’s allegations, but they plainly state a continuing danger of serious physical injury 
that was imminent at the time he filed his complaint. 
The District Court also reviewed Prall’s extensive history of litigation.  The 
District Court’s description of Prall as an “inexorable litigant” is apt, and we share its 
concerns.  Nevertheless, the PLRA permits even litigious prisoners to proceed without 
pre-payment of the fee if they are under imminent danger of serious physical injury, and 
Prall has adequately alleged as much in this case.  See Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 965.  We 
further note that the majority of Prall’s previous civil actions were habeas proceedings in 
which he challenged his criminal convictions.  We are not aware of any civil action in 
which Prall has alleged abuse by correctional officers of the kind he alleges here.  If he 
had a history of raising such allegations, our ruling may well have been different.  As it 
is, however, Prall is eligible to proceed without pre-paying the filing fee. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for it 
to grant Prall’s motion for leave to proceed IFP if it determines that he has made a 
sufficient showing of indigence, see Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 161 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998), 
and thereafter to conduct such further proceedings as may be appropriate.  We emphasize 
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that we express no opinion on the merits of Prall’s claims and that his complaint remains 
subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  See Gibbs, 160 F.3d at 967.  Prall’s 
motions to expedite this appeal and for other relief are denied.1
                                                 
1 As a prisoner, Prall is required to pay the filing fee for this appeal in installments.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).  The Clerk is directed to issue a separate order noting that 
Prall’s IFP motion on appeal has been granted and directing the assessment and 
collection of fees in accordance with the statute. 
 
